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THE IDIOM OF SPIRIT:

DiscouRsE, HuMAN NATURE, AND
OTHERNESS
A Response to Philip Clayton and Steven Smith

Philip Rossi, S. J.
In a context where key "modern" conceptualities no longer hold uncontested sway, Philip Clayton and Steven Smith offer us proposals
for construing" [the] spirit" in categories which they present as both
philosophically plausible and theologically significant. Although the
differences between the two papers, both in substance and style, are
worthy of extended discussion, my comments will focus just on those
points in which I find them in striking convergence. One reason for
attending to their convergence is that even though "spirit" has been
no more than a peripheral topic of discussion in philosophy for much
of this century, the philosophical landscape has recently seen changes
and shifts which seem to open space again for a category of spirit. In
these circumstances, it thus seems that an important initial task for a
philosophical retrieval of spirit is to locate itself with respect to the
range of philosophical options currently available. This task of"philosophicallocation" seems especially incumbent, moreover, upon any
construal of "spirit" that hopes as well to engage the multiple discourses of current theology. This is so because the theological landscape has also changed 1-and the transitions which have started to
become visible in each discipline also affect those parts of the terrain
of inquiry in which a philosophical articulation of spirit will most
likely take abode: the often quite precarious terrain where philosophy and theology have variously co-habited, contended, or even attempted co-dominion.
Within this terrain, there are a number of sites which I see both
papers identifying as a specific common ground on which a philosophical construal of "spirit" can be located. My comments on the
common ground staked out by these proposals are offered from a
perspective which is, in the main, sympathetic to much of what they
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ambition with respect to a notion of "spirit." This common ground
is situated around four coordinates:
First, in their efforts aim to fashion an idiom of"spirit" that will be
mutually intelligible in and for philosophical and theological
discourse (s);
Second, in their location of an important part of that intelligibility
by reference to the dynamics of an embodied, social, and historical
human existence. Both papers reference their projects-and the categories to be shaped in it-to the dynamics of an embodied, social,
and historical human existence; these dynamics attend especially to
the relational form of human subjectivity and to the relational forming of human intersubjectivity in interaction with a world; I note
here that this is itself a central part of the contested terrain of the
modern condominium of philosophy and theology.
Third, in their taking account of striking contributions (positive
and negative) made by thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Schleiermacher,
and Levinas to articulating the relational forms of human subjectivity as a resource for conceptualizing "spirit"; and
Fourth, in their recognition that, if we are at all to speak philosophically about such matters-about subjectivity, relationality, and
spirit-we cannot but do so metaphysically, i. e, that our talk about
such matters requires the systematic articulation of the constitutive
categories and the fundamental character of what we affirm as real
and true and good and beautiful. Both papers thus speak in philosophical idioms not so long ago considered part of the "dead" language of metaphysics-but both do so, however, aware that the very
project of metaphysics has been a contested conceptuality, for both
philosophy and theology, within "modernity", and that it remains all
the more so in a our so-called "post-modern" context.
Yet as I try to move with each proposal along the lines they have
sketched out with respect to these four coordinates, I find myself
wondering (which, pace Steven Smith, I'll not yet try to claim as an
authentic motion of "spirit"!) whether these are precisely the directions along which I would recommend striking out in order to bring
us closer to places where our contemporary philosophical and theological conversations could begin to resonate more fully with the language [or should it be languages?] of the "spirit." Let me try briefly to
express what these "wanderings" are as a way to further discussion of
each proposal.
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1 . .fu I read both papers, it seems to me that both Smith and Clayton
acknowledge that, in a world of plural philosophical and theological
discourse, no single idiom of "spirit" may be mutually intelligible to
all. As a result, the project of construing spirit philosophically must
rely on identifYing which forms of discourse and which discourse
communities it hopes, both now and in the future, the idiom of spirit
to address. My wondering on this point, however, is not so much
about which communities of discourse Smith and Clayton seek to
engage in conversation about the spirit now, but more about how
they might envision engaging those forms of philosophical (and other)
discourse and, perhaps even more crucially, those forms of social and
cultural practice which seem in principle closed to an articulation of
"spirit" in any idiom. My point of reference here is to the work of
thinkers such as Charles Taylor, Michael Buckley, Louis Dupre,
George Steiner and, more radically John Milbank, each of whom has
delineated ways in which we are situated-indeed ways in which we
situate ourselves-within a widely pervasive dynamic of modern/postmodern culture that enables and encourages us to perform, in Taylor's
words, "spiritual lobotomy" upon ourselves. 2 In these circumstances,
there certainly can be little doubt for many of us that there is needeven desperate need-for the breath and the utterance of the Holy
and of the human "spirit."
But this very possibility that we can be willing, complicit agents of
the self-stifling of spirit makes me wonder how these proposals could
be further elaborated with a view to addressing those parts of our
culture-and thus of ourselves-in which imperviousness to the
movement of spirit and deafness to spirit's utterance are deeply and
systematically entrenched: for instance, to addressing spirit-stifling
practices which seem part of a global, post-industrial, and putatively
market-driven capitalism. On this point, it seems that Smith's discussion of the dynamics of "spirit" as rectifYing-especially as a rectifying of relation-and of"attitude [as] ... the location at which the
required energy and direction for pursuing relationship are either
present or absent in a subject" (p. 220) might prove to be useful
starting points for such an elaboration. The direction of such an elaboration, moreover, is one that I hope would enable at least some idiom
of the spirit-and thus the dynamics of rectifYing spirit-to enter
into those spheres of wider public discourse which bear upon the
shaping and the right ordering of a society's relational practices.
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2. While my first bit of wondering may have more to do with
matters which the papers do not directly address, my second one has
to do with matters which they do. It's also not unconnected with my
first bit of wondering, since it concerns the specific forms of philosophical discourse which both papers do engage. Two of the markers
of the "spirit discourse" which they propose are the particular referencing of the idiom of "spirit" to the dynamics of an embodied and
social human existence and, as part of this, to relational forms of
human subjectivity: it is along these anthropological coordinates which
they direct us to seek primary resources for fashioning a philosophically intelligible idiom of"spirit." This idiom, moreover, is polyglotby design I suspect-since in it can be discerned accents that are
postmodern, modern, and premodern as well. It is modern in (among
other things) its turn to subject and to the anthropological; it is
postmodern in (among other things) its concrete situatedness and its
attention to interruption and otherness. It is an idiom, moreover, in
which a key matrix for the transformative interplay of modern and
postmodern is found in the intersubjectivity of language. And then
there are discernable accents of the pre-modern as well, in that these
proposals each seek a living-or even better, a vivifying link withidioms of "spirit" that have been shaped in communities which still
attend to idiom of spirit as it was given voice in ancient Israel and to
the echoes, resonances, and transformations of that idiom in the centuries of Christian discourse.
My wondering here thus concerns the complex interplay-at once
phenomenological, historical, and systematic-among relationality,
intersubjectivity, and language which these proposals offer as a dynamic for fashioning an appropriate idiom of "spirit." Both papers
recognize that referencing the idiom of spirit to the relational, intersubjective, and linguistic dynamics of our human existence must contend with lines of philosophical thinking that stretch at least as far
back as Descartes and on their way to us have passed through (among
other places) Amsterdam, Edinburgh, Konigsberg, Jena, Berlin,
Copenhagen, Basel, Vienna, Cambridge, Frankfurt and Paris. One
intriguing sign of this common recognition is the way that Kant and
Schleiermacher, both historically and systemically, serve as key reference points in each paper; and even as Clayto-n's paper explicitly situates itself with respect to a number of particular figures who traced
these lines, Smith's more allusively casts its argument against the background of various efforts to grapple with this modern philosophical
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heritage. Both papers recognize that this heritage is itself contested
ground and they each seem to have different vantage points upon
that contestation. But I also think-subject to correction-that both
papers share one point of consensus that seems to have emerged from
this heritage: the hesitancy of the modern and post-modern alike to
speak of the dynamics of human existence (be it of individuals or of
us in common) in terms of a "human nature."
I don't propose to argue that the hesitancy is not well-founded:
there are indeed good historical and conceptual reasons to tread cautiously in the vicinity of a concept-or, I think more accurately, a set
of concepts-whose significance and function currently elicits little
consensus even within "regional" circles of philosophical discourse,
let alone across those circles, and, least of all, in cross-disciplinary
discourse. My wonder here, then, is not so much about the absence
of "human nature" as vocabulary entry in the discourse of subjectivity, intersubjectivity, relationality, and language. My question is rather
about the syntax governing the use of these terms: how do (or might,
or ought) we structure our use of the vocabularies of subject, person,
intersubjectivity, relationality in the absence of reference to a notion
of human nature which, it seems to me, functioned syntactically to
place some constraint on what it makes sense to say about who-and
what-we are, both individually and collectively? This, I think, is
akin to the questions that Clayton raises on pp. 190-92 of his paper
about the self-constituting subject-though in his discussion, the
syntactical constraint on what we may say of the self comes in terms
of a notion of transcendence. (Though I will not pursue it further
here, it seems that some of the important relations among these notions of"self/subject," "nature/world" and "transcendence/God" could
be usefully explored in terms of how they place mutual syntactical
constraints on one another.)
3. My third-and final-bit of wondering derives from the second.
I perceive in the hesitancy to use the vocabulary of"human nature"even while acknowledging the need for some kind of counterpart
syntactical constraint on what we may legitimately say of our
(inter-)subjectivity-a tension between the "anthropological" and the
"metaphysical"-and, in the case of Smith's proposal, between these
two and the "transmetaphysical"-in forging an effective and a persuasive contemporary idiom of spirit. The larger context in which I
would like to place this wonder is not, however, the oft-told (and in
my judgment, the by-now-tired) story of the con testability of meta-
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physics and the rumors of its death; it is, instead, the shift which
seems to have taken place in the locus from which metaphysics is
construed and metaphysical discourse is constructed. This is the shift
from "thought" and "being" (or, as some might put it, from the "rational" and the "real") to "language" and "relation"-a shift which,
though it certainly encompasses the one from "substance" to "subject," is just as certainly not exhausted by it. This shift, as I see it, is
not one of replacement, but of what we might call "focal displacement": it is not that the systematic articulation of fundamental constitutive categories for what we affirm as real and true and good and
beautiful no longer can be referenced to "being" or "thought" and or
"substance"-but that these earlier focal categories for metaphysical
discourse now in turn need to be referenced to new and at least equally
weighty points of focus-" language" and "relation" and, perhaps most
intriguingly, to "otherness" and "difference."
My sense is that the idioms of spirit which Clayton and Smith each
present are fashioned not only in awareness of this shift but as participant in it. As in the case of the hesitancy to speak in terms of
human nature, my concern is not about whether such a shift-and
making the idiom of spirit participant in that shift-is well founded.
Modern and post-modern accounts of "the real"-even though they
may not use that precise term-have made it difficult for to us avoid
the importance, perhaps even the necessity, of construing it-and
thus ourselves-in terms oflanguage. As Charles Taylor has pointed
out: "From where we stand, we are constantly forced to a conception
of man as a language animal, one who is constituted by language."3
To this conception of our being constituted as human by language,
we are increasingly being led to add "and by relation, by difference,
and by otherness." Though it may very well be a matter of legitimate
dispute whether we should (or even can) avoid going along the paths
these notions enable us now to chart, prudence suggests to me that
we consider ourselves as already moving on them. As a result, I think
that our concern should be about the role which a (re)new(ed) idiom
of spirit might play in illuminating where this shift is taking us-or,
to put it in a different voice-with whether and how the spirit is
with us as we move along the paths of living which we have already
started to chart from this shift.
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ENDNOTES
1

The most visible of these shifts has been in the rise of so-called "post-modernist"
issues and modes of inquiry, but there are others: e. g., the internal and sometime
even fractious pluralism of the long dominant and seemingly monolithic "analytic philosophy" of the English-speaking world has become far more apparent;
there has been a significant revival of interest in philosophy of religion and in the
history of philosophy, both previously considered shabby and disreputable in
comparison to the hard-nosed and tough-minded conceptual analysis of "real"
philosophy. In most Catholic philosophical and theological circles the breakdown of an Aristodean-Thomist-scholastic "consensus" -if there ever really was
one-has long been apparent and no single successor option holds sway.
Similarly, as Protestant theology has moved out from the towering landmarks set
down by the giants of neo-orthodoxy, paths have been staked out along almost
every point on the theological compass.
2
Taylor uses this phrase in Sources of the Self The Making of the Modern Identity,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 520. A succinct presentation
of key elements which motivate his project to retrieve a notion of the spiritual is
found in his Marianist Award Lecture "A Catholic Modernity" (Dayton: The
University of Dayton, 1996). For some of the other notable efforts to diagnose
the roots of the current culture conditions which make possible denial and
forgetfulness of "spirit" see Michael Buckley, At the Origins ofModern Atheism
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Louis Dupre, Metaphysics and
Culture, The Aquinas Lecture 1994 (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press,
1994); Passage to Modernity: An Essay in the Hermeneutics ofNature and Culture
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993); John Milbank, Theology and Social
Theo ry: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990); George Steiner, Real
Presences (Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1989).
3
"Language and Human Nature," Human Agency and Language: Philosophical Papers
I, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989): 246

